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AUTHORITY

AGO, D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 May 70) FOR OT UT 701276 19 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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1 Incl
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10th Psychological Operations Battalion

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-10C

7 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R1)

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1. Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. Personnel: During the period 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970 the Battalion received one warrant officer and twenty-nine enlisted men. During the same period, eight officers and twenty-seven enlisted men departed.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) This report covers a period of ninety-two days, fourteen of which were devoted to training.

(2) On 15 November 1969, redeployment of all field teams assigned to the 10th PSYOP Battalion was completed. Since that time all tactical psychological operations in IV CTZ have been conducted by Vietnamese agencies with support being provided by this Battalion. Concurrent with the redeployment of the field teams the mission of the 10th PSYOP Battalion was changed. The mission now is:

"To support psychological operations of Vietnamese military and pacification programs. To process, evaluate, produce, and deliver communications material in support of these activities in IV CTZ."

(3) Progress continues to be made in Vietnamization of the PSYOP/PSYWAR effort in the Delta. The following actions were developed or refined during the reporting period:

(a) The Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) has become the coordination center for PSYOP support in IV CTZ. In addition, this Center has the capability to coordinate quick-reaction missions. Two Quick Reaction Exploitation Teams, each consisting of an American and Vietnamese interrogator, have been formed and can be rapidly deployed to any location in IV CTZ. They are equipped with tape recorders and cameras in order to exploit any situation. When a team has been deployed, one 1250W press is readied to produce any propaganda which may be developed. Several of these missions have been received, processed, printed or recorded, and disseminated within twenty-four hours.

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The CPOC is staffed by Vietnamese PSYOP personnel from the 40th POLWAR Bloc, IV CTZ, 40th POLWAR Battalion, and members of the 10th PSYOP Battalion. Currently seventy-seven personnel, thirty-four Vietnamese and forty-three Americans, man the center which includes the printing plant. They work in the areas of Research and Analysis, Media Analysis, Media Production, Media Control, and Media Dissemination. The CPOC is headed by a Vietnamese officer with an American officer as his deputy. The environment of the Center, in which Vietnamese and Americans work together, has provided opportunity for the ideas of both groups to interact. In this manner the Vietnamese are receiving training in all aspects of propaganda development. As their experience increases, the Vietnamese are assuming more responsibilities in each of the sections.

(b) The Joint Air Operations Center, established in order to achieve maximum use of available PSYOP aircraft and to train Vietnamese personnel in aerial PSYOP support operations, has continued to develop during the reporting period. The Center has made the following accomplishments:

(1) Joint scheduling of both USAF and VNAF PSYOP aircraft is conducted on a weekly basis. The best type of aircraft is assigned to each mission based on utility and capability, regardless of whether it is requested by Vietnamese or American agencies. Maximum use of available assets is thereby achieved.

(2) A quick-reaction capability has been established for aircraft of both air forces. An aircraft can be diverted at any time during the day in order to exploit a quick-reaction situation.

(3) Every province in IV CTZ now receives at least one leaflet and one loudspeaker mission each week. Assurance of this support is made possible by the joint scheduling of assets. The Vietnamese, under the guidance of US advisors, now fly 60% of the forty-six missions which the Center receives weekly. Prior to the forming of the Center, in October 1969, Vietnamese aircraft accounted for only 28% of the missions flown.

(4) Coordination is now being made to utilize VNAF C-47 aircraft for leaflet missions in IV CTZ. There are also indications that several more speaker-equipped U-17 aircraft will be available in IV CTZ. When arrangements have been completed for use of these additional air assets, Vietnamese control of aerial PSYOP in IV CTZ will be complete except for night loudspeaker support which will have to be provided by the 9th Special Operations Squadron, USAF.

(c) Vietnamese soldiers from the 40th POLWAR Battalion have been trained in the procedures involved in the operation of the printing facility. Members of that unit have received training in fields including press operation, platemaking, varityping, and photography. The goal of this training is to prepare the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Vietnamese to operate a printing plant comparable to that of the 10th PSYOP Battalion.

(d) During the reporting period, civic action projects have been conducted by the Battalion in conjunction with the 40th POLWAR Bn. The Civic Action Officer has been accompanying and advising the Vietnamese in village operations which provide information and aid to the villagers as well as practical training for graduates of the POLWAR school.

(4) The CPCC, working with the PHOENIX (Phung Hoang) program, has developed a leaflet layout for depicting wanted members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). These leaflets, which may be used as posters or two-sided handouts, are produced by the CPCC from information and photographs provided by province PHOENIX personnel. The posters have been highly successful. For example, shortly after the publication of a poster portraying ten wanted men, two of the individuals were arrested and three rallied. Seventy-two such posters have been produced, and an average of ten requests per week has been received for this material. A special convertible format has been developed to increase the speed and quality of production of these posters. Using this format, the material is printed as a four-up 5"x8" layout, backed up, then cut once into 8"x10" halves, the requestor then has the option of using the 8"x10" posters, which contain both sides of the layout, or of making another cut and using the material as 5"x8" two-sided leaflets.

(5) The CPCC has developed five-color posters of thirty-four Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) units in the Delta. These posters enhance morale and esprit-de-corps within the units and demonstrate to the people that military forces are present to protect them. The CPCC continues to receive numerous requests for these posters.

(6) The CPCC has completed the Vietnamese translation and printing of the "Guidebook Media Catalog". This book includes the leaflet and tape catalog of the Battalion, a summary of the graphic, photographic, and printing capabilities of the CPCC, lessons learned in the production and dissemination of leaflets, guidelines for the composition and employment of propaganda tapes, and procedures for requesting aerial PSYOP support. The guidebook will be distributed to all Vietnamese units and agencies in IV CTZ to assist them in the preparation, requisition, and use of PSYOP materials.

(7) The Battalion's Printing Plant has developed another technique for stripping negatives to make plates used on the 1250W press. This system uses an eight-up format. Using this method, one-sixth of a multilith strip-up sheet is attached to a full sheet. This reduces the time involved in the development stage by eliminating at least one exposure, decreases the printing and cutting time, and economizes on the use of materials, especially the strip-up sheets. A detailed report on this technique is attached as Inclosure 1.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RC: CSFOR-65 (R1)

(8) The Battalion has coordinated with the 164th Combat Aviation Group to carry Chieu Hoi leaflets on all helicopter gunships. The concept is to put a limited number of leaflets on an enemy position immediately following an attack by gunships. In order to properly cover small targets from the altitudes involved, while avoiding the weight of a large quantity of leaflets, a new system of dissemination, utilizing paper bags, was developed. Experiments have proved that a 16 lb paper bag containing 1,500 leaflets is an ideal means of leaflet dissemination from a helicopter. Instructions on use of these bags is attached as Inclosure 2. The aviation group has been provided pre-packaged leaflets for every gunship.

(9) Throughout the reporting period, aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions have been continually flown by both Vietnamese and US Air Forces in IV CTZ. Particular emphasis has been placed on areas of known NVA infiltration routes and suspected base camps. Several quick-reaction leaflets and tapes, made by NVA Hoi Chanh from the areas involved, have been developed and employed, and allied attacks and bombings have been exploited.

2. Section II - Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Decline in the Hoi Chanh Rate during the TET Season:

(a) OBSERVATION: The trend in this and previous years has disclosed a decrease in Hoi Chanh prior to the TET season.

(b) EVALUATION: This decrease may be attributed to the fact that the VC leaders are reluctant to allow the men freedom at this time as they might meet their families and not return to the unit. Security is enhanced because the VC are planning their spring campaign and the soldiers are kept close together for indoctrination and classes. Also, the men are kept busy with harvesting of rice and preparations for TET.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Concentrate PSYOP appeals on encouraging the VC to return to their homes and enjoy TET and, concurrently, appeal to relatives of VC to urge them to rally. Increase ARVN operations in conjunction with PSYOP appeals to weaken the increased VC security during TET. In addition, ralliers could be provided with a TET bonus which would eliminate their concern over finances for the TET period.

(2) Lack of Total Utilization of PSYOP Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION: PSYOP aircraft in IV CTZ are not always utilized to

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7 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

their full potential (flight time).

(b) EVALUATION: Aircraft are often requested to land at province air fields to obtain target information, leaflets, or tapes. Occasionally the requesting agency has been unable to meet the aircraft or the required mission has not utilized all of the available flying time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Supply all PSYOP aircraft with strategic pre-planned targets and tapes which may be employed in the event that a province-based mission is aborted, or fails to utilize all of the allotted time of the aircraft.

(3) Leaflet Drops from Helicopter Gunships

(a) OBSERVATION: Leaflets dropped from helicopter gunships in contact with the enemy are an excellent PSYOP weapon as they reach the target audience while he is receiving fire, or when he may be confused and demoralized immediately after an attack.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Other units should consider the use of gunships for the dissemination of leaflets.


d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

2 Incl
as


JAMES R. WARREN
LTC, INF
Commanding

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AVGM-C (4 March 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 10th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO 96243 30 March 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning decline in Hoi Chanh rate prior to TET season, page 4, Section II, paragraph 2b(1); non-concur. In 1967, the greatest number of Hoi Chanh (countrywide) rallied during the Feb TET period. In Jan 1968, there was an overall increase in Hoi Chanh (countrywide) from Dec 67, and the number of Hoi Chanh did not reach the Jan (TET) level again until June of 1968. In IV CTZ in Jan 1968 (pre-TET), the Chieu Hoi rate was the second highest during the first half of the year. In Feb 69 in IV CTZ, there was a large decline in the number of Hoi Chanh during the TET period but not prior to it. The same statement applies to Chieu Hoi rates countrywide for that period in 1969. In 1970, the decline appears to be part of an overall drop in Chieu Hoi rates which might be interpreted either as reflecting positive effects of the GVN pacification/security effort (fewer VC left to rally) or increased confidence among the VC in their ability to win the war in the long run. In the Delta, two possible effects of NVA presence might account for the overall lower rates seen in 1970 to date: increased confidence in victory due to NVA presence, or increased control over local VC by NVA leaders and cadre. Appeals to VC to return to family, or to the family to encourage their VC relatives to return, are presently stated objectives or methods. An increase in the use of these psychological objectives may be indicated in this case. The TET bonus suggestion has merit, but could conceivably be used whether the Chieu Hoi rate drops or not, if the Chieu Hoi Ministry had the funds available to back such a program.

3. Reference item concerning Lack of Total Utilization of PSYOP Aircraft, page 4, Section II, paragraph 2b(2); concur. The recommendation is a basic management of resources tool. In addition, it is recommended that the IV CTZ single PSYOP manager instruct the APA PSYOPs and the province/district S5 requestors to meet the aircraft or their requests will not be honored. Secondly, in that preplanned targets are submitted a week in advance, there should not be a frequent need to land at a province airfield for targets, tapes and/or leaflets. Targets and tapes could easily be submitted thru courier channels to the CPOC for evaluation and processing in accordance with published instructions prior to flight time. Finally the majority of leaflets are produced or stocked by the battalions. Perhaps the minimal amount produced by VIS could be packaged by the bag and disseminated by courier planes and/or helicopters.


AVGM-C

4 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 10th Psychological Operations
Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

4. Reference item concerning Leaflet Drops from Helicopter Gunships, page 5, Section II, paragraph 2b(3); concur. This practice has concurrently been undergoing testing and evaluation in other CTZ and has been received with similar favorable comments. In addition to gunships, observation helicopters and command helicopters have been utilized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES M. RILEY
MAJ, Armor
Adjutant

Copy furnished:
CO, 10th PSYOP Bn

AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 6 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 10th
Psychological Operations Battalion and concurs with the comments of
indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



D. J. WINTER
1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
10th PSYOPS Bn
4th PSYOPS Gp

GPOP-DT (7 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-10C

19 January 1970

SUBJECT: Platemaking and Strip-up Techniques

1. Purpose:


a. The 10th Psychological Operations Battalion has been testing various techniques to improve the quality of our printed product, and to increase economy and efficiency in printing operations.

b. The techniques described below have been developed and tested in our printing operations. They have improved our printing operations and are recommended for consideration by other units.

2. Platemaking Process:


a. Layout and Strip-up of 3x6 inch Leaflets:

(1) Figure A illustrates the present method of laying out and strip-ping up 7 3x6 inch leaflets. Figure B illustrates the method we have developed. For explanatory purposes consider the leaflet is to be printed on both sides, in one color, with no halftones. Two different plates are required for the job; one for the front and one for the back.




1

FIGURE A



2



1

FIGURE B

2

(a) The platemaker aligns the edges of the strip-up sheet A1 with the edges of the plate.

(b) He seals the strip-up sheet and the plate together in the platemaking machine.

(c) He exposes the strip-up sheet and plate to bright light for 5 minutes.

(d) He removed and develops the plate.

(a) The platemaker aligns the edges of corner B1 of the strip-up sheet with the edges of the plate.

(b) He covers the end leaflet in corner B2 with a piece of opaque paper.

(c) He seals the strip-up sheet and plate together in the platemaking machine.

(d) He exposes the strip-up sheet and plate to bright light for 5 minutes.

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(e) He covers the center leaflet on the A1 strip-up sheet with a piece of opaque paper.

(f) He aligns the edges of the strip-up sheet A1 with the edges of the plate.

(g) He seals the strip-up sheet and the plate together in the platemaking machine.

(h) He exposes the strip-up sheet and plate to bright light for 5 minutes.

(i) He removes strip-up sheet A1 and aligns strip-up sheet A2 with the edges of the plate.

(j) He seals the strip-up sheet and the plate together in the platemaking machine.

(k) He exposes the strip-up sheet and plate to bright light for 5 minutes.

(l) He removes and develops the plate.

(e) He removes and develops the plate.

(f) He aligns the edges of corner B2 of the strip-up sheet with the edges of the plate.

(g) He covers the end leaflet in corner B1 with a piece of opaque paper.

(h) He seals the strip-up sheet and plate together in the platemaking machine.

(i) He exposes the strip-up sheet and plate to bright light for 5 minutes.

(j) He removes and develops the plate.

(2) Some of the advantages are immediately obvious. It requires one less strip-up sheet, and it eliminates one five minute exposure.

(3) A plate will average 8000 impressions, varying from one extreme to another. Plate life is affected by variables such as: quality of manufacture; shelf-life of the plate; heat and humidity during storage; exposure time and intensity; development, to include shelf life of the chemicals; oxidation between the time the plate is developed and the time it is used on the press; pressure between the plate and the blanket; the acidity of the fountain solution; and how well the press feeds. Some plates fail before 2000 impressions are obtained. Others are still good after 17,000 impressions. Experience reveals that two plates are often required per side for a job of 10,000 impressions.

(4) Considering two minutes are required to align and seal the plate and strip-up, and five more minutes for exposure, it requires a minimum of 21 minutes to make two plates. In an order for 8,000 to 16,000 impressions, a total of 42 minutes of platemaking time was previously required. Using the proposed method, it takes only fourteen minutes to make two plates or for every four plates made using the current system, six could be made using the proposed system.

(5) On short order runs, less than 8,000 impressions, press down time has been experienced due to delay in getting plates made. That delay time can be reduced by using the proposed system. If a plate breaks down before a second plate is made it takes fourteen minutes (not including development time), as compared to seven minutes (not including development time) with the proposed system. A two-color leaflet printed both sides with no halftones requires six exposures to make the required four plates. Using the proposed system only four exposures are necessary. A three-color job presently requires nine exposures, as compared to six with the proposed system. A four-color job presently requires twelve exposures, as compared to eight with the proposed system.

(6) The saving discussed is measured in minutes for one press. This may seem inconsequential in light of a 24-hour workday, 7 days a week. However, with several presses operating, a fourteen minute savings for each press on each job amounts to many hours of platemaking time during a 24-hour period. Press down-time while awaiting plates will also be significantly reduced.

(7) Another advantage occurring from this proposal is realized in the cutting operation. The present "7up" configuration requires only five cuts. The time saved in this process results in a twenty five percent reduction. That is, for every three stacks cut by the present method, four could be cut in the same time using the proposed format. This process reduces the time a job is in the bindery section, and also lessens the wear on the paper cutter.

b. Multilith Strip-ups:

(1) Multilith strip-up sheets are not long enough to hold the proposed strip-up layout. To make it long enough requires adding a 3-inch strip from another multilith sheet. This can be done by cutting one multilith sheet into six 3-inch strips and taping one 3-inch strip to the end of a full multilith sheet (allowing a 1-inch overlap). Current procedures require two multilith sheets for a "7up", one color, printed both sides, no halftones leaflet layout. The proposed method requires one and 1/6 multilith sheets for the same job; or, for every six leaflet jobs it would take seven multilith sheets, as compared to twelve multilith sheets now used for the same six jobs. The work of the stripper does not change. Although he would have to add the 3-inch strip to the regular sheet, he would have one less sheet to strip-up.

(2) To simplify the changing of systems, a metal template to be laid over the multilith sheets and used as a guide to cut the layout should be prepared. This technique has been adopted for all new leaflet orders. As time is available, and based on a usage history of leaflets on file, it is recommended that all the filed leaflets be returned to graphics and restripped to the new layout.

NOTE: Discussion of halftones was deliberately excluded from the previous suggestion because of the following detailed recommendation on their strip-up.

c. Strip-up of Halftones:

(1) Using the present system, halftones are stripped-up on a multilith sheet separate from line work. In the platemaking process this requires an exposure for the linework and an exposure for the halftones. The recommended method is to strip-up the halftones and the linework on the same multilith sheet and expose them both at the same time.

(2) The following advantages are realized: for a leaflet order printed "7up" one color, two sides, with halftones on one side, the present system requires four exposures to make two plates. Using the procedures recommended above, the same order would require three exposures. Using the recommended procedures the order would require only two exposures to make both plates. A leaflet order the same as above except with halftones on both sides now requires five exposures for two plates. Adoption of these suggestions would mean the plates could be done in two exposures. This recommendation is not confined to leaflets printed "7up". It applies to any and all orders that use a halftone. In every case it is a difference of at least one exposure.

(3) The procedure of stripping halftones with the line work begins with the original line copy. On the line copy that goes to the cameraman, a piece of the dullest finish, blackest paper available should be pasted down wherever a halftone is to appear on the final printed sheet. When this is photographed and developed by the cameraman, the black areas will be completely transparent on the negative. The halftones can then be cut to fit the transparent areas, and secured in position with tape or rubber cement.

3. Conclusions:

a. The above techniques have been developed for local operations. It is recognized that they may not apply to the operations of other PSYOP units.

b. These techniques, which were recently developed, will continue to be tested and refined as required.

c. They are a result of experience, experimentation, and the desire of the battalion printing personnel to improve the support provided US and GVN PSYOP agencies in IV CTZ. .

d. These techniques have proved more efficient through a reduction in time and materials required in platemaking and strip-up procedures.

e. These techniques should be considered by qualified personnel in other units.


Dissemination Instructions

①



GRASP BAG FIRMLY BY THE
NECK.

②



SWING BAG IN DOWNWARD
MOTION

③



CONTINUE TO GRASP NECK OF BAG AND GIVE A PRONOUNCED
UPWARD SNAP OF THE WRIST (AS IN CRACKING A WHIP).

④ ONE OR TWO BAGS PER HELICOPTER WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE
COVERAGE OF STRIKE AREA.

⑤ FOR INCREASED ACCURACY, OFFSET LEAFLET DRIFT BY ONE MILE
FOR EACH 5 KNOTS OF WIND SPEED.

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